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ABSTRACT 
Transparency is generally recognised as an effective 
policy instrument to increase accountability and fight 
misconduct. To further our understanding of 
transparency impact in arms exports, it is thus useful to 
investigate the EU transparency framework, and analyse 
the extent member states are adhering to it. This 
research does it by examining contribution of France, 
Germany, and the UK to the Annual Reports in relation 
to their arms exports to the Middle East during 2010-
2016. The results indicate that not all studied member 
states provide full information. Moreover, they 
intensified export practices despite the growth of 
military conflicts in the Middle East. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of WWII, the arms proliferation has been 
under rigorous scrutiny due to its impact on global peace 
and stability. The fact that the volume of international 
transfers of major weapons has been growing steadily 
since 2003 indicates lack of efficiency of the arms control 
measures (Fleurant, Kuimova, Tian, Wezeman & 
Wezeman, 2018). Considering that among the top ten 
largest arms exporters in the period between 2013 and 
2017, six are member states of the EU (Fleurant et al., 
2018), cautious questions can be raised to the EU, which 
is the only international institution with a legally binding 
agreement that regulates exports of conventional arms.  
In 2008, the EU adopted the “Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP” that succeeded the 1998 EU “Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports,” which was the first attempt to 
define common rules for military exports. Like its 
predecessor, the Common Position aims to strengthen and 
harmonize arms exports practices by providing guiding 
principles. The main difference between the two policies, 
however, is that the Common Position is a legally binding 
agreement. It aims to set high common standards and 
restraints in arms trade by facilitating the information 
exchange “with a view to achieving greater transparency” 
(The Council, 2008, p.99). This wording suggests that the 
EU strives for greater responsibility in arms exports, and 
to use transparency as a tool to increase accountability, 
enhance control, and build confidence in the compliance 
of member states.  
The conduct of EU member states, nevertheless, has 
already been questioned in connection with their arms 
export practices prior to the Arab Spring (Bromley, 
2012; Hansen & Marsh, 2015; Stavrianakis, 2017). This 
criticism notwithstanding, in 2012, the Council of the 
EU reviewed this policy and its implementation, and 
concluded that “provisions of the Common Position, 
and the instruments it provides for, continue to properly 
serve the objectives set in 2008 and to provide a solid 
basis for the coordination of Member States’ arms 
export policies” (The Council, 2012). Therefore, based 
on the Council’s conclusions we might anticipate an 
effective regulation of the EU arms exports. 
But how substantial is the control in the EU arms exports? 
In order to find this out, I investigate the transparency 
framework developed by the Common Position, and 
analyse the extent to which France, Germany, and the UK 
are adhering to it. This research is thus guided by the 
following research question – to what extent did France, 
Germany, and the UK comply with the aims of achieving 
greater transparency stated in the Common Position in 
relation to their arms exports to the Middle East during 
2010-2016?  
 
TRANSPARENCY AS A NORM IN ARMS CORNTOL 
Transparency has become a buzzword that overwhelmed 
political rhetoric and seems to be a solution to every issue. 
This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that 
“transparency” has explicitly positive connotations, and is 
associated with purity and clarity (Bessire, 2005). As the 
opposite of secrecy (Florini, 2000), transparency is defined 
as “something wider than access to (government) 
information” (Heald, 2006, p.26). In this definition, 
transparency has a strong connection to information, access 
to which is perceived as a powerful regulatory instrument 
(Bessire, 2005). Transparency thus can be seen as a 
genuinely democratic tool that empowers a broad audience 
with knowledge.  
As a policy instrument, transparency primarily facilitates 
policy regulation and evaluation. The principal-agent 
model demonstrates the regulatory effect of transparency. 
The principal uses transparency as a tool to ensure that the 
agent does not abuse their power, and acts correctly on 
behalf of the principle (Hansen, Christensen & Flyverbom, 
2015). This refers to state actors who are in charge of 
policy implementation and are observed by the public. As 
an outcome of such public monitoring, transparency 
eliminates information asymmetry that can be used by the 
agents to promote their interests. Transparency thus 
prevents misconduct by ensuring that state actors do not 
abuse their power. Another vital function is that 
transparency facilitates policy evaluation by providing 
necessary information about the actions of the actors 
responsible for policy implementation. Consequently, 
transparency is an effective instrument to improve policy 
implementation by “holding public officials accountable, 
reducing fraud and fighting corruption” (Hansen et al., 
2015, p.118; cf. Hood & Heald, 2006). 
As a result, international regulations are actively 
promoting transparency as an instrument to increase 
effectiveness of policy measures (Davis, 2002). Likewise, 
in the EU arms control, transparency is a recommended 
method. As evidence of that the Common Position aims to 
achieve “greater transparency” (The Council, 2008, p.99) 
by facilitating information exchange and providing annual 
reports on arms exports to review the conduct of member 
states. Based on this, transparency presents a recognised 
norm and a “condition for regulation” in the EU arms 
control (Surry, 2006, p.6). 
 
 
TRANSPARENCY FRAMEWORK IN THE EU  
ARMS EXPORTS CONTROL 
The essence of the Common Position is constituted by 
eight guiding principles that should be taken into 
consideration by member states when deciding on the 
arms exports. By setting these criteria, the Common 
Position aims among the other goals to ensure that 
member states prevent arms exports, which “might be 
used for internal repression or international aggression or 
contribute to regional instability” (The Council, 2008, 
p.99). To facilitate consistency of policy implementation 
the User’s Guide to the Common Position (The Council, 
2015) clarifies the arms exports licensing process and 
provides best practices of applying the guiding principles. 
To increase accountability in arms control and ensure 
correct implementation of the guiding principles 
mentioned above, the Common Position seeks to achieve 
transparency by “strengthening the exchange of relevant 
information” (The Council, 2008, p.99). For this purpose 
the User’s Guide provides specific instructions on 
transparency (The Council, 2015). According to the 
User’s Guide, member states should send annual reports 
on their arms export activities to the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), which is the EU diplomatic 
service and foreign and security ministry.  
The User’s Guide specifies that such report should 
include the number and value of export licences granted 
to each destination, the value of actual exports, the 
number of denials for every destination including 
reasoning, and the number of consultations received and 
initiated. Information provided by the member states to 
the EEAS is summarised and then published in the 
Annual Reports. Consequently, the Annual Report is the 
main transparency tool that provides information on the 
member states’ arms export practices. 
 
HOW TO ASSESS THE QUALITY OF TRANSPARENCY 
In order to develop a systematic framework to assess 
the quality of transparency, six assessment parameters 
developed by Bauer were taken into consideration. 
These are availability, reliability, comprehensiveness, 
comparability, disaggregation, and relevance (in Surry, 
2006, p.1). These parameters were developed to address 
transparency as a broad policy instrument. Taking into 
account that member states have a limited influence 
over the aspects, such as availability and methodology 
of the data presented in the Annual Report, the analysis 
will look into the peculiarities of the transparency 
system, which are in the direct responsibility of member 
states. This initially refers to the parameters of 
comprehensiveness and disaggregation, which describe 
type, quantity and the level of detail. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE EU TRANSPARENCY 
FRAMEWORK 
In light of the EU transparency framework, and the 
parameters to assess the quality of transparency outlined 
in the previous section, it is now possible to investigate 
the transparency framework in the context of EU arms 
exports control. 
Type, quantity, and level of detail 
This subsection will look into the content of Annual 
Reports by addressing the parameters of comprehensives 
and disaggregation. This is particularly valuable in order 
to define the scope member states can contribute to the 
transparency framework. Eventually, this will help to 
assess the compliance of France, Germany, and the UK 
in the following subsection. 
According to the Common Position, member states should 
annually submit reports with information on the number 
and value of export licences granted to each destination, 
value of actual exports, number of denials for every 
destination including reasoning, and number of 
consultations received and initiated. However, not all 
information provided to the EEAS is made available for the 
public through Annual Reports. An analysis of information 
that is required for submission and that was found in the 
Annual Reports is given in Table 1. 
Table 1. Transparency framework of the Common Position 
Information from a member 
state on arms exports 
Should be 
provided to  
the EEAS 
Found in  
EU Annual 
Reports 
Number of export licences 
granted to each destination, 
broken down by Military List 
category (if available) 
If available If available 
Value of export licences 
granted to each destination, 
broken down by Military List 
category (if available) 
If available If available 
Value of actual exports to each 
destination, broken down by 
Military List category (if 
available) 
If available If available 
Number of denials issued for 
each destination, broken down 
by Military List category 
Included Not included 
Number of times each criterion 
of the Common Position is used 
for each destination, broken 
down by Military List category 
Included Not included 
Total EU number of licence 
refusals to each destination 
Can be drawn 
based on the 
data provided 
Included 
Criteria numbers on which 
refusals are based to each 
destination 
Can be drawn 
based on the 
data provided 
Included 
Number of consultations 
initiated Included Included 
Number of consultations 
received Included Included 
Address of national website for 
annual report on arms exports. Included Included 
(Source: Elaboration of data from the EU Annual Reports 
on arms export, 2011-2018) 
Remarkably, in the User’s Guide, the most significant 
information regarding the value of the actual arms 
exports and licensing has a note “if available” without 
further explanation what this means. Moreover, the 
Common Position does not specify if there are any 
sanctions in case member states fail to report. It remains 
thus unclear when non-submitting is caused by the 
unavailability of the information, or whether the decision 
on disclosure is left at the discretion of member states.  
Having defined the type and quantity of information, we 
can examine the level of detail. In Annual Reports, 
information on arms exports is required to be specified by 
the standardised military list and destinations. Thus, one 
can look at the value of arms exports, number of approved 
licences, their value, and type of arms that member states 
export into each country. 
The Annual Reports, however, provide aggregated data 
with limited level of detail. For example, information on 
the export licences denials and their reasons provided in 
aggregated form for every destination. It is thus unclear 
which member state refused an export licence and based on 
what criteria this decision was made. Furthermore, data on 
information exchange between member states through the 
consultancy procedure is also limited. The number of 
consultations is given in total for every member state, and 
as a separate list for every destination, and not supported 
by further detail. As a result, the reason why a 
consultation was needed and its outcome are not 
explained. 
To conclude, there are uncertainties in relation to what 
kind of information member states are obliged to provide 
and whether there are any sanctions in case of 
noncompliance. In order to assess the efficiency of the 
Common position, the next subsection will examine how 
France, Germany, and the UK contribute to the 
transparency framework. 
 
France, Germany, and the UK: Contribution to 
transparency framework 
The previous section outlined the main features of the 
transparency framework, and analysed the scope of 
information that member states should report. Therefore, 
the compliance of France, Germany, and the UK with the 
transparency goal will be estimated based on the data in 
the Annual Reports regarding their arms exports to the 
Middle East in the period of 2010-2016. 
In the Annual Reports, the most valuable information 
refers to the value of the actual arms exported by member 
states. Figure 1 provides the available data on this 
parameter for the studied countries and the EU total.  
Figure 1. Value of actual arms exports to the Middle East 
 
(Source: Analysis of data from the EU Annual Report on 
arms export, 2011-2018) 
It is evident that there is no consistency in data over the 
studied period. In particular, information on the total 
value of EU arms export is given only for two years, 2010 
and 2016. And there is no clarification why this 
information is missing for other periods. One possible 
explanation can be that member states provide incomplete 
information on their export practices (Bauer et al., 2017). 
In addition, there is no data on Germany and the UK in 
relation to the value of their actual export to the Middle 
East. In contrast, information on the French exports is 
available for the whole period.  
Having analysed the available data, we observe the stable 
growth of arms exports to the Middle East. Comparing 
the EU total arms exports at the beginning and end of the 
studied period, a growth of 202% is identified. Moreover, 
based on the data provided, it is evident that France is 
accountable for a considerable part of the EU arms 
exports to the Middle East. Figure 1 demonstrates that the 
French arms exports are stable in 2010-2014, after which 
it grows 154% in 2015 and then 16% in 2016. In the EU 
total arms exports, the share of the French arms exports, 
however, declines from 75% to 57% comparing the 
beginning and the end of the studied period. Because of 
the missing data and lacking explanation, it is unclear 
whether Germany and the UK failed to report their data, 
or these countries they did not export any arms to the 
Middle East in the studied period. Most important, it is not 
explained how the total value for EU was calculated 
considering incomplete data. 
Notably, the growth of French arms exports to the Middle 
East in 2015 coincides with an intensification of military 
conflicts in this region, which is evident based on the 
information presented in Figure 2. It can be concluded that 
despite of the growth of armed conflicts, EU member states 
continued to export arms to the Middle East.  
Figure 2. Regional distribution and total number of armed 
conflicts 
 
(Source: SIPRI, 2017, p.3) 
Another valuable information in arms control refers to the 
export licences, which is summarised in Figure 3. An 
approved export licence presents an authorisation in 
accordance with EU standards in arms control. Thus, the 
value of the approved license will eventually convert into 
the real arms exports.  
Figure 3. Value of issued export licences to the Middle 
East 
 
(Source: Analysis of data from the EU Annual Report on 
arms export, 2011-2018)  
In the observed period, all studied countries reported the 
value of approved export licences to the Middle East. It can 
be noted that the total value of issued licences indicates a 
stable growth, starting at the beginning of the period with 
an insignificant decrease in 2013. In 2014, it dramatically 
increases fourfold and continues to grow. The value of 
issued export licences reaches its peak in 2015 and then 
demonstrates a decline, which is, nonetheless, almost 10 
times higher than in 2013. 
Based on this analysis, France is the main contributor to 
the growth of the value of the approved export licences. 
Most importantly, the information on issued exports 
licences confirms that Germany and the UK authorise arms 
exports to the Middle East. They do not, however, report 
on their actual arms exports as it is seen from Figure 1. 
This fact presents strong evidence that Germany and the 
UK do not comply with the transparency goals defined in 
the Common Position. 
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CONCLUSION	
This paper has analysed to what extent France, 
Germany, and the UK comply with the aims of 
achieving greater transparency defined by the EU 
Common Position. The goal of the study was to 
investigate the efficiency of the Common Position, 
which is the unique legally binding policy in the field 
of conventional arms exports control. The analysis was 
preformed based on the information on the arms export 
practices of France, Germany, and the UK to the 
Middle East during 2010-2016. Taking into account 
the growing arms proliferation this is vital to explore if 
the Common Position is an effective regulation. The 
research was limited to three EU member states: 
France, Germany, and the UK. Their arms export 
practices are of high importance since these cournties, 
as the top EU and world arms exporters, set the pattern 
of behaviour for other member states and the 
international community.  
The main finding of this study is that despite increased 
transparency and facilitated information exchange, the 
studied member states do not contribute fully to the 
main transparency tool, the Annual Reports. France is 
the only one among the studied countries that presents 
its data on the value of the actual arms exports. 
Another important finding is that despite multiple 
military conflicts in the Middle East, member states 
did not reduce their arms exports. On the contrary, they 
intensified exports and even the migrant crisis in 2015 
did not affect their practices. Finally, the Common 
Position does not define any sanctions in relation to 
members state in case they do no comply with its 
fundamental principals.  
In view of these findings, it can be concluded that the 
Common Position, although it had introduced the 
transparency framework, proved to be unable to set 
“high common standards” in arms exports (The 
Council, 2015, p.99). Most importantly, it failed to 
restrain export practices to the zones that might be 
affected by military conflicts.  
The findings revealed an urgent necessity to strengthen 
the regulation of the EU arms exports. The 
implementation of the guiding criteria of the Common 
Position should be facilitated, while its practical 
application made fully available for the public. 
Another necessary measure should be increased 
transparency in the reporting on the EU and national 
levels. Member states should be obliged to provide 
detailed information not only on licencing, but also on 
the actual arms exports. In addition, the Common 
Position should introduce sanctions to ensure 
compliance of EU member states with the policy. As a 
result, such measures should help to hinder the arms 
proliferation and reduce the likelihood of a future 
global conflict.	
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